Why's Ford not allowing people to tune the S650 Mustang?

[Neggytive]

Is this a new part or always been there?

I am looking at @LevittownFordParts website and I am seeing a lot of parts for the Mustang that were not there the last time I looked.

Strut braces, Dark Horse steering wheels, 3.55 loaded center sections, lots of interesting things, I am just digging into it now for the first time.

It may take a while

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[8LAKK8UNSHINE]

There is someone making 1000 whp on the dyno with a turbo S650 claiming that kits will be available soon. I can't find the original video, so here is a link to Ears POV video ABOUT IT:

It sounds like they may not necessarily have cracked the ECU for tuning, but they figured out something. My Whipple just showed up, so I'm sticking with that and my little 700+whp.

 

[Neggytive]

Let me know how they are keeping the Cat's from blowing out

There are people using the Whipple kits that are putting out more than the ones Whipple is providing for Ford Performance and there have been failures of the cats due to heat and flow exceeding the design capacity, and Ford is denying warranty claims on the ruined Cats

 

[robvas]

Let me know how they are keeping the Cat's from blowing out

There are people using the Whipple kits that are putting out more than the ones Whipple is providing for Ford Performance and there have been failures of the cats due to heat and flow exceeding the design capacity, and Ford is denying warranty claims on the ruined Cats

Quite a few shops are making ~1000hp with a Whipple

but they also have built transmissions, aftermarket fuel pumps, longtube headers, etc etc

 

[8LAKK8UNSHINE]

Who is making more than 1000 whp? This is not bhp - it's whp! And it's turbo! This is not a Whipple. I have a WHipple and even with long tube headers, people are creeeping up past 800 on pump gas.

The way to keep it right with the long tubes and high flow cats is to gut them. That is the solution - or just go catless! I'm not messing with the stage 1 and depending on warranties. I voided my warranty within 30 days of ownership. Don't need it, I'll handle it!

 

[ZXMustang]

Plain and simple Ford is just sucking the creme from whipple and Roush just like many other industries do with vendor exclusive content and products. At some point, someone from Ford or Ford themselves will slip out the back door the cheat code on what needs to happen to be able to not only write to the PCM/TCM but also allow the car to start.

Because up to this point here are some facts of whats occured.

There are shops that have been able to read out the PCM/TCM of the 24+ GT and DH (I know because I have both HPT files for them)

There are shops that have been able to flash edited calibrations back to the 24 cars.

Once Flashed back, the cars WILL NOT START. No start. This is where the buck stops. Once the calibration encryption checksums or whatever validation the rest of the modules are using to know the PCM or TCM or XCM hasn't been compromised fails, the car will not pass the checksum validation and no start.

It was explained a while back I believe by a Ford employee that due to the internet connected nature of these new gen cars, they have privacy concerns with your personal, driving and vehicle data and that needs to be protected from man in the middle attacks due to module decryption. They claim they have the cars modules locked down so it cant be intercepted from the vehicle to Ford through the air/internet and decrypted/stolen.

There is a method to their madness, but as a coyote calibrator myself I surely hope this happens soon. Clearly they've allowed Whipple and Roush to have the keys to the castle. For how long, who knows. But You can bet at some point those keys will get leaked and its going to go nuts.

I already have my brand new 25 GT sitting in the garage waiting for tunes to be tested on.

 

[ZXMustang]

This is what my personally trained Ford calibration AI has to say on this subject.


The 2024+ Mustang GT (S650 platform, Coyote Gen 4) uses a high-security, encrypted PCM (Powertrain Control Module) architecture that currently prevents HP Tuners, SCT, and other aftermarket companies from gaining write access to the ECU. This restriction is not due to a lack of support in the tuning software, but because Ford has implemented a hardware- and firmware-level encryption lockout combined with secure boot and key-signed calibration authentication mechanisms.

Key Reasons Why 2024+ Mustangs Cannot Be Tuned by HP Tuners:

1. Encrypted PCM Firmware & Secure Boot Chain:
   • Ford now uses encrypted firmware with signed binaries. These require validation at boot using secure hardware keys stored in the microcontroller's protected region.
   • Any calibration or OS file must be signed by Ford’s private key to pass validation. Unauthorized edits invalidate the signature, causing the PCM to reject the file and fail to boot.
2. Undocumented Processor & Bootloader:
   • The 2024+ Mustang GT PCM is based on a newer generation of microcontrollers (likely NXP or Renesas) with locked bootloader access.
   • JTAG and debugging interfaces are disabled or require a secure challenge-response handshake, making reverse engineering impractical.
3. No Known Exploits or Unlock Service:
   • Unlike earlier Ford ECUs (like 2011–2020 Coyote), no known bootloader exploits or backdoors exist that can be used for a patch/unlock.
   • HP Tuners and other vendors cannot currently offer a “modified PCM” service like they do for GM (E90, E99) or Dodge (2015+ GPEC2/3).
4. Ford’s OEM Calibration Program Restriction:
   • Whipple and Roush have access because they are certified Tier 1 calibration partners with Ford. They receive signed binaries via Ford’s internal calibration pipeline and use Ford-signed custom OS files that retain secure boot compatibility.
   • These calibrations are not editable by the end user or third parties. The tuning is done upstream by Ford or with tools like Ford’s CalTool and EDR systems under NDA.
5. No End-User Unlock Path Exists Yet:
   • As of May 2025, HP Tuners does not list the 2024+ Mustang GT as supported.
   • Even using MPVI3 with Pro Feature Set or TDN offers read-only access, and only basic scanning—not flashing.

Summary

Until a manufacturer-approved aftermarket PCM is released, or Ford decides to provide a third-party access protocol (unlikely), only Ford-authorized calibrators (like Roush and Whipple) will be able to tune the 2024+ Mustang GT.


Would you like a breakdown of what Ford’s encrypted boot process looks like, or the current list of supported controllers by HP Tuners for reference?

 

[ZXMustang]

This is how my AI would approach this problem to get the ability to tune these cars.


To be clear: bypassing OEM encryption protections on ECUs (like the 2024+ Mustang GT’s PCM/TCM) would violate U.S. federal laws, particularly the DMCA (17 U.S. Code § 1201), unless done for approved security research or with the manufacturer’s authorization. That said, for theoretical and academic analysis, here's how one would typically assess such a secure architecture:


Modern ECU Security Architecture Summary (2024+ Mustang GT):

1. Secure Boot + Code Signing – Bootloaders validate firmware signatures.
2. Encrypted Flash Regions – Firmware and calibration regions are encrypted.
3. JTAG/SWD Lockout – Debugging interfaces disabled or require authentication.
4. Read/Write Partition Control – Cal area protected by region-based access.
5. Asymmetric Key Exchange – Signing done using Ford-held private key; ECU only holds public key.

Theoretical Attack Vectors:
1. Side-Channel Attacks

• Objective: Extract cryptographic keys via power analysis or EM radiation.
• Tools: ChipWhisperer, oscilloscope, differential power analysis (DPA).
• Reality: Requires destructive testing on desoldered MCU. Effective only on poorly protected key storage.

2. Flash Dump via Chip-Off

• Objective: Desolder MCU, dump flash and EEPROM directly.
• Tools: Hot air station, BGA rework, programmer (Xeltek, TL866), NAND readers.
• Reality: Almost always encrypted. Without matching keys, data is useless.

3. Glitching or Fault Injection

• Objective: Temporarily bypass security checks using voltage or clock glitches.
• Tools: EMFI (electromagnetic fault injection), crowbar setups, voltage glitchers.
• Reality: Used in Tesla, Xbox, and iPhone exploits. Only feasible with full lab setup and dozens of test units.

4. Vehicle Bus Exploits (e.g. UDS, CAN, FlexRay)

• Objective: Abuse diagnostic routines (e.g. 0x27 SecurityAccess) for flash mode entry.
• Tools: CAN interface (Kvaser, Intrepid, or MPVI3 with custom commands).
• Reality: Modern ECUs use rolling seed-key challenge with unique VIN-tied or HMAC-salted derivation. Brute force is infeasible.

5. Reverse Engineering Ford's Diagnostic Tools

• Objective: Analyze IDS/FDRS or dealership-level flash tools for private unlock logic.
• Tools: Static disassembly (IDA Pro, Ghidra), network intercept (Fiddler, Wireshark).
• Reality: Fails at encryption layer. Any flash routine still relies on signed binaries.

6. Leaked Signing Keys or Compromised Supplier Firmware

• Objective: Obtain a genuine signing certificate or exploit a backdoor.
• Examples: FCA’s GPEC2 leaked key (2018), Nissan bootloader bypass.
• Reality: This is the most practical—but rare and illegal without authorization.

Summary

Even assuming full hardware teardown and memory dumps, you cannot flash unsigned or altered binaries because the digital signature validation will block boot. Unless you:

• Extract the private signing key (nearly impossible),
• Find a firmware-level vulnerability, or
• Obtain a signed custom OS through a backchannel,

...there is no path to write arbitrary calibrations using HP Tuners or similar tools.



If this is part of a legitimate research proposal (e.g., academic, OEM, or cybersecurity lab), a proper approach would be:

1. Partner with an authorized lab (e.g., NCC Group, IOActive).
2. Work under NDA with Ford or Tier 1s.
3. Use instrumented ECUs on a dev bench with security researcher carve-outs.

Would you like a theoretical architecture flowchart of how Ford's secure boot works from a research standpoint?

 

[Zig]

Would you like a theoretical architecture flowchart of how Ford's secure boot works from a research standpoint?

not really but the question remains unanswered. If it take this little screwdriver and turn that just a bit it opens the carb just a little bit more, now why can’t i do that with my computer controlled vehicle?

 

[Gregs24]

Plain and simple Ford is just sucking the creme from whipple and Roush just like many other industries do with vendor exclusive content and products. At some point, someone from Ford or Ford themselves will slip out the back door the cheat code on what needs to happen to be able to not only write to the PCM/TCM but also allow the car to start.

Because up to this point here are some facts of whats occured.

There are shops that have been able to read out the PCM/TCM of the 24+ GT and DH (I know because I have both HPT files for them)

There are shops that have been able to flash edited calibrations back to the 24 cars.

Once Flashed back, the cars WILL NOT START. No start. This is where the buck stops. Once the calibration encryption checksums or whatever validation the rest of the modules are using to know the PCM or TCM or XCM hasn't been compromised fails, the car will not pass the checksum validation and no start.

It was explained a while back I believe by a Ford employee that due to the internet connected nature of these new gen cars, they have privacy concerns with your personal, driving and vehicle data and that needs to be protected from man in the middle attacks due to module decryption. They claim they have the cars modules locked down so it cant be intercepted from the vehicle to Ford through the air/internet and decrypted/stolen.

There is a method to their madness, but as a coyote calibrator myself I surely hope this happens soon. Clearly they've allowed Whipple and Roush to have the keys to the castle. For how long, who knows. But You can bet at some point those keys will get leaked and its going to go nuts.

I already have my brand new 25 GT sitting in the garage waiting for tunes to be tested on.

This is exactly how it should work. We now have cybersecurity requirements in Europe I assume the same in the US) for cars.

I doubt simply leaking a 'key' will either ever happen or be the solution anyway. The security is baked in to the car and all of the modules.

 

[Gregs24]

not really but the question remains unanswered. If it take this little screwdriver and turn that just a bit it opens the carb just a little bit more, now why can’t i do that with my computer controlled vehicle?

There is no question to answer. There is no screw. The car is locked down.

 

[Zig]

There is no question to answer. There is no screw. The car is locked down.

But that is the question. The magic box that was ‘carter, holley, elderbrock’ let folks tune and didn’t cause these liability issues.

 

[Gregs24]

But that is the question. The magic box that was ‘carter, holley, elderbrock’ let folks tune and didn’t cause these liability issues.

No it isn't. The world has changed since then. There is no question to ask as you already know the answer. They cannot be tuned, they are designed that way.

Elderbrock sounds like a soft drink!

 

[Zig]

No it isn't. The world has changed since then. There is no question to ask as you already know the answer. They cannot be tuned, they are designed that way.

Elderbrock sounds like a soft drink!

Was supposed to be edlebrock

 

[Zig]

No it isn't. The world has changed since then. There is no question to ask as you already know the answer. They cannot be tuned, they are designed that way.

Elderbrock sounds like a soft drink!

Has it changed for the good or the bad? I mean do the kids of today realize how crappy they have it?

is it called an api for a reason?

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